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Abstract
Infectious diseases on farms pose both public and animal health risks, so under-
standing how they spread between farms is crucial for developing disease control
strategies to prevent future outbreaks. We develop novel Bayesian nonparametric
methodology to fit spatial stochastic transmission models in which the infection rate
between any two farms is a function that depends on the distance between them,
but without assuming a specified parametric form. Making nonparametric inference
in this context is challenging since the likelihood function of the observed data is
intractable because the underlying transmission process is unobserved. We adopt a
fully Bayesian approach by assigning a transformed Gaussian Process prior distribu-
tion to the infection rate function, and then develop an efficient data augmentation
Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to perform Bayesian inference. We use the
posterior predictive distribution to simulate the effect of different disease control
methods and their economic impact. We analyse a large outbreak of Avian In-
fluenza in the Netherlands and infer the between-farm infection rate, as well as
the unknown infection status of farms which were pre-emptively culled. We use
our results to analyse ring-culling strategies, and conclude that although effective,
ring-culling has limited impact in high density areas.
Keywords: Avian Influenza, Bayesian Nonparametrics, Disease Control, Epidemic Mod-
els, Gaussian Processes
1 Introduction
Diseases of livestock and farmed poultry, such as Avian Influenza or Foot and Mouth
Disease, pose serious public and animal health risks, as well as having a considerable
impact on both the domestic and international farming economy. Authorities are keen to
control the spread of such diseases as quickly as possible to reduce the health risks, but
must also consider other stakeholders, such as farmers, and the economic consequences
of intervention.
∗To whom correspondence should be addressed.
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In 2003 a serious outbreak of a highly pathogenic Avian Influenza A/H7N7 virus
took place among poultry farms in the Netherlands. Over the course of three months,
more than 30 millions birds were culled, 90 people developed influenza-like symptoms,
with six confirmed cases, and one fatality occurred (Koopmans et al., 2004). The Dutch
authorities implemented a culling strategy to control the disease, whereby animals were
culled on farms where the pathogen was detected, and pre-emptively culled on farms
within a certain distance from the site of detection. For convenience we shall refer
to farms as naturally culled or pre-emptively culled in the obvious manner. The culling
strategy took place alongside strict biosecurity measures and a ban on the transportation
of poultry goods (Directorate-General for Health and Consumers, 2003). In the data set
we use there is a total of 5,397 Dutch poultry farms, including 241 infected farms and
1,232 pre-emptively culled farms. The approximate locations of the farms are shown in
Figure 1.
There is a clear spatial element to the spread of the disease; for example, there
are two distinctive clusters of infected farms, within which there appears to be local
transmission. However, analysing the disease spread is challenging due to the fact that
the infection process is not observed. For farms which were confirmed to be infected,
the date of poultry culling was recorded, but the date on which poultry on the farm
were first infected was unobserved. The infection status of pre-emptively culled farms is
considered uncertain, since absence of clinical suspicion at the time of culling would not
necessarily rule out the presence of the pathogen.
Various data were collected during the outbreak. The particular data set that we shall
focus on consists of the spatial coordinates of all poultry farms in the Netherlands, plus
the culling dates and identities of all farms that were either naturally or pre-emptively
culled. There are several previous approaches to modelling data from this outbreak.
In Stegeman et al. (2004), the authors construct a model based on a generalised linear
model proposed in Becker (1989), where the number of new infections per day is as-
sumed to follow a Binomial distribution. However, the infection rate is assumed to be
constant between all farms, which is a questionable assumption given the clear spatial
element to the spread of the disease. In Boender et al. (2007), the authors use a type
of generalised linear model which allows for spatial variation in spread of the disease,
and propose several plausible forms for the infection rate as a function of distance. It is
assumed that pre-emptively culled farms are never infected, and that unobserved events
such as infections occur at known times, obtained by simple assumptions motivated by
expert opinion. Models are fitted using maximum likelihood methods and the Akaike
Information Criterion is used to choose between them. In Backer et al. (2015), the au-
thors take a different approach allowing for both within- and between-farm infections.
The authors use a spatial model described in Boender et al. (2007) and choose values
for the model parameters based on those in van der Goot et al. (2005) among others.
The outbreak has also been studied from a public health and veterinary perspective,
analysing the symptoms both humans and poultry display, see, for example, Fouchier
et al. (2004); Koopmans et al. (2004); Elbers et al. (2004).
Although some previous modelling approaches attempt to capture the spatial varia-
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Figure 1: A map of the poultry farms in the Netherlands with their status at the end of
the outbreak.
3
tion in the infection rate, they rely on making strict parametric assumptions about the
infection rate as a function of the distance between farms; such functions are commonly
called distance kernels. The choice of a particular distance kernel may not accurately
represent the underlying process and can lead to incorrect predictions which, in conse-
quence, can have a significant impact on formulating policy decisions with regards to
optimal disease control measures such as culling. Our approach removes the need to
make such assumptions by modelling the infection rate nonparametrically. We do this
by treating the infection rate as an unknown function with a transformed Gaussian Pro-
cess (GP) prior distribution. This allows us to make more general assumptions about
the type of function, for example how smooth it is, whether it is continuous, or if it is
monotonic, rather than its exact shape. Furthermore, previous modelling approaches as-
sume that the times at which farms were infected are known. In this paper we relax this
assumption, by adopting a data-augmentation approach within a Bayesian framework
in which we treat infection times as additional parameters. We make inference for the
infection rate function using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm, which
also allows us to infer the unobserved infection times, and to estimate the probability of
any pre-emptively culled farm having been infected.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the available data,
define our stochastic transmission model in detail and derive an augmented likelihood
function assuming that the epidemic process is fully observed. In Section 3 we present
our Bayesian nonparametric approach by specifying a transformed GP prior distribution
for the infection rate function and the prior distributions for the other model parameters.
We also describe an efficient MCMC algorithm to sample from the posterior distribution
of the parameters given the observed data. In Section 4 we demonstrate the proposed
models and methods via an application to simulated data and the Avian Influenza data
set. We also illustrate how our methods can be used to assess control strategies. We
finish in Section 5 with brief conclusions and a discussion of our methods.
2 Methodology
2.1 Data
The data set contains the geographical locations of 5,397 poultry farms in the Nether-
lands at the time of the outbreak. We discarded 931 hobby farms from the data set,
where a hobby farm is defined as having fewer than 500 poultry. For each farm, the
data specifies its status at the end of the outbreak, describing whether or not it had
contracted the virus, had been culled due to confirmed infection, or had been culled pre-
emptively. For farms which were culled we have the date on which this occurred. After
the removal of hobby farms, the data set contains 4,466 farms. Of these, 233 farms were
confirmed to be infected and consequently culled, while 1,232 farms were pre-emptively
culled. Table 1 illustrates the available information for each farm in the data set.
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Table 1: An example of the available information on each farm. Farms 1 and 2 were
confirmed to be infected and culled in consequence. Farm 3 was culled pre-emptively
and farm 4 was not culled. Farm geographical locations are provided in terms of x and
y coordinates.
Farm ID x y Culling Date Pre-emptively Culled
1 5.25 52.13 5th May ×
2 5.59 54.49 10th April ×
3 4.99 55.00 2nd May X
4 5.50 51.40 - -
...
...
...
...
...
2.2 Stochastic Epidemic Model
We construct our model based on the standard susceptible-infective-removed epidemic
model in continuous time; see, for example, Bailey (1975); Andersson and Britton (2000).
Consider a population consisting of N farms. We assume that initially all farms are
disease free apart from one which contains animals infected via some external source.
At any time t, a farm is either susceptible to the disease, infected with the disease and
infectious, or removed as the animals on the farm have been culled. The model dynamics
can be separated into two processes: the infection process and the removal process. The
infection process is governed by a rate function β(d), where d denotes the Euclidean
distance between two farms.
We assume an infectious farm infects a given susceptible farm that is d km away
according to a Poisson process with rate β(d). The processes governing different pairs of
farms are assumed to be independent. For the removal process, once a farm is infected
it is assumed to be infectious for a time which follows a Gamma distribution, Γ(λ, γ),
which has mean λ/γ and variance λ/γ2. The infectious periods of different farms are
assumed to be independent. Note that the infectious period of a farm is the time between
infection and culling as a result of infection being detected, rather than the time period
during which animals would be infectious in the absence of any intervention.
To account for the fact that some farms are pre-emptively culled by the authorities as
a disease control measure, we introduce pre-emptive culling times. We make no attempt
to explicitly model the culling strategy, since in practice such strategies may change over
time or not always be carried out as originally intended. Instead, we assume that pre-
emptive cullings are deterministic events. If, under the disease control strategy, a farm is
pre-emptively culled at time t, then the farm becomes removed at time t irrespective of
whether it is currently susceptible or infectious. From this time, it can no longer infect
other farms or be infected. We shall refer to culling events that are not pre-emptive as
natural cullings. The epidemic continues until there are no more infected farms.
5
Table 2: The infectious status of each farm at the end of the outbreak.
Set Infected Culled Pre-emptively Culled
A × × ×
B X X ×
C X X X
D × X X
2.3 Likelihood
Recall that the observed data consist of culling times, which can be pre-emptive or not,
and farm locations. To fit our model to such data in a Bayesian framework requires the
likelihood of the observed data given the model parameters. However, such a likelihood
is intractable in practice since its computation involves integrating over all unknown
infection events; see, for example, O’Neill and Roberts (1999); Jewell et al. (2009). We
therefore proceed by deriving a likelihood based on full observation of the epidemic
process, and use a data-augmentation MCMC algorithm as described in Section 3.
Let N denote the total number of poultry farms in the Netherlands and n the number
of ever-infected farms. We denote the infection and culling times for farm j by ij and
rj respectively, where culling may be pre-emptive or natural. We label the infected
farms 1, . . . , n by their culling date (i.e. r1 ≤ r2 ≤ . . . ≤ rn) and the remaining farms
n+ 1, . . . , N arbitrarily. We denote by ω the label of the initially infected farm.
We denote by i = {i1, . . . , iω−1, iω+1, . . . , iN} the set of all infection times excluding
the initial infection time iω. If farm j was not infected, its infection time is set to be
ij = ∞. We account for pre-emptive culling by defining rj = min(rpj , rcj), where rpj and
rcj denote, respectively, the pre-emptive and natural culling time of farm j. We consider
the times rpj to be deterministic, and set r
p
j =∞ if farm j was not pre-emptively culled.
For farms which were not culled at all, we set rpj = r
c
j = ∞, hence rj = ∞. The
sets rc = {rc1, . . . , rcN} and rp = {rp1, . . . , rpN} denote the set of natural and pre-emptive
culling times, respectively.
We require the following sets based on the infection status of the farms during the
outbreak. SetA consists of the farms that remained susceptible to the disease throughout
the course of the epidemic and were not culled, set B is the set of farms that were infected
with the virus and naturally culled in consequence, set C is the set of farms that were
infected but were culled pre-emptively, and finally set D consists of the farms that were
not infected but still pre-emptively culled. These sets are shown in table 2. Note that
if a farm has been pre-emptively culled, we are unable to distinguish whether it belongs
to set C or D unless its infection status is known.
The likelihood function consists of three parts: a contribution from farms avoiding
infection, a contribution from farms being infected, and a contribution from farms re-
maining infectious until culled. For a farm k in either set A, B or C, the probability it
avoids infection from infectious farm j, until either j is removed or k is infected, is
ψj,k = exp{−β(dj,k)((rj ∧ ik)− (ij ∧ ik))},
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where β(d) is the infection rate for a pair of farms that are d km apart, and a ∧ b =
min{a, b}. The difference in minimum times is the amount of time during which farm j
is able to infect k. If farm k is in set D we must take into account its pre-emptive culling
time, rk = r
p
k, and the corresponding probability is given by
ψj,k = exp{−β(dj,k)((rj ∧ rk)− (ij ∧ rk))}.
When farm j is infected, the set of farms that are able to infect j is
Yj = {k : ik < ij < rk},
so the event that j is infected contributes to the likelihood function through the overall
hazard rate of infection given by
φj =
∑
k∈Yj
β(dk,j).
For the removal process, the likelihood contribution is given by∏
j∈B
h(rj − ij | λ, γ)
∏
j∈C
S(rj − ij | λ, γ),
where h(x | λ, γ) is the probability density function of a Γ(λ, γ) distribution evaluated
at x and S(x | λ, γ) is the survivor function
S(x | λ, γ) =
∞∫
x
h(u | λ, γ)du.
Farms in set B, that were infected and culled at the end of their infectious period,
contribute to the likelihood function through the total time during which they were
infectious. For those in set C, which were infected but culled pre-emptively, we con-
sider their removal time as a censoring time, and compute the probability they would
have remained infectious past their culling time. Combining the infection and removal
processes gives the augmented likelihood function
pi(i, rc,B, C,D | β, λ, γ, ω, iω, rp)
=
 ∏
j∈B∪C
N∏
k=1
ψj,k

 ∏
j∈B∪C
j 6=ω
φj
∏
j∈B
h(rj − ij | λ, γ)
∏
j∈C
S(rj − ij | λ, γ) (1)
= exp {−Ψ}
∏
j∈B∪C
j 6=ω
∑
k∈Yj
β(dk,j)
∏
j∈B
h(rj − ij | λ, γ)
∏
j∈C
S(rj − ij | λ, γ),
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where
Ψ =
∑
j∈B∪C
[ ∑
k∈A∪B∪C
β(dj,k) ((rj ∧ ik)− (ij ∧ ik))
+
∑
k∈D
β(dj,k) ((rj ∧ rk)− (ij ∧ rk))
]
. (2)
Note that the set of culling times determines which farms belong to the set A, which
is why A does not appear explicitly in the left-hand side of equation (1).
3 Bayesian Nonparametric Inference
We wish to make Bayesian inference for the unknown model parameters given the ob-
served data of farm locations and culling dates (see Table 1). If a farm was not culled
by the end of the outbreak, we assume that it remained susceptible throughout the out-
break. Hence, the observed culling dates determine which farms belong to set A. For a
farm that has been pre-emptively culled, its infection status is unknown and therefore
we cannot determine from the observed data if such a farm belongs to set C or D. Also,
the infection process defined in our model is not observed directly. Hence, the label of
the initially infected farm ω, its infection time iω and the infection times of the farms
belonging to sets B or C are unknown.
We adopt a data augmentation framework (see, for example, Jewell et al. (2009)) in
which we include the farms’ unknown infection event times and statuses as additional
model parameters to the ones which govern the transmission and removal processes.
Combining the augmented data likelihood (1) with the joint prior distribution, by using
Bayes’ theorem, the target posterior density is given by
pi(β, γ, ω, iω, i, C,D | B, λ, rp, rc) ∝ pi(i, rc,B, C,D | β(·), λ, γ, ω, iω, rp)
×pi(β)pi(λ)pi(iω | ω)pi(ω),
where we have assumed that β, λ and (ω, iω) are independent a priori.
3.1 Prior Distributions
We now discuss in detail the prior distributions for the infection rate function and the
other model parameters.
3.1.1 The Infection Rate Function
We wish to infer the infection rate function β nonparametrically and to do so we will
use a transformed Gaussian Process (GP) as a prior distribution. We follow Rasmussen
and Williams (2006) and define a GP as a collection of points, any finite subset of which
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follow a multivariate Normal distribution. Suppose we wish to model a function f , over
a space χ, specifically being interested in the values of the function f(x1), . . . , f(xn)
evaluated at the points x = {x1, . . . , xn}. We specify the GP prior distribution on f by
f ∼ GP(µ,Σ),
where µ is the mean function and Σ the covariance matrix, defined using a covariance
function k. We build our assumptions about f into the model through the covariance
matrix, and to do so we use the squared exponential function. This is given by
Σi,j = k(xi, xj ;α, l), k(xi, xj ;α, l) = α
2 exp
{
−(xi − xj)
2
l2
}
.
The function k has two hyperparameters, namely α, which controls the overall variance,
and l, which controls the length scale. The value of l essentially determines how much
the function can change as the input changes. We implicitly assume that f is smooth
and differentiable. Many other choices for the kernel function are available (Rasmussen
and Williams, 2006), but our choice appears suitable for the application at hand.
The input space of the function β is the space of Euclidean distances. We specifically
wish to evaluate β at d, the set of pair-wise distances between all farms. As the GP prior
distribution gives non-zero probability to negative values and we are modelling a rate
which is always positive, we introduce a dummy function g and use the transformation
β = exp{g}. In other words, we are placing a GP prior distribution on log β by specifying
that
g ∼ GP(0,Σ), Σij = k(di, dj ; α, l), β = exp{g}
where di is the Euclidean distance between the ith pair of farms.
A well-known problem arises with GPs when the size of the covariance matrix is large,
since this creates computational difficulties with matrix inversion and decomposition; see,
for example, Hensman et al. (2013); Csato and Opper (2002); Quinonero-Candela and
Rasmussen (2005). For the Avian Influenza data set, there are over 9 million unique pair-
wise distances from which the covariance matrix is constructed. In the MCMC algorithm
we will develop, we will require the covariance matrix to be repeatedly decomposed
and inverted, which is not feasible in practice with such a large matrix. We therefore
approximate the GP prior distribution using a projection method first described in
Quinonero-Candela and Rasmussen (2005). We construct a pseudo set of distances, d¯,
that is much smaller than the original set d. While d¯ need not be a subset of d it should
provide an adequate representation of d. We then place a GP prior distribution on the
pseudo set and draw samples from this distribution. The joint prior distribution of the
pseudo function, f¯ and the full function f is(
f¯
f
)
∼ GP
(
0,
(
Σd¯,d¯ Σd,d¯
Σd¯,d Σd,d
))
,
where the subscripts on the Σ matrices denote the vectors used to construct them. We
can then project the samples onto the full data set by considering the conditional distri-
bution of f given the pseudo function f¯ . We take f to be the mean of this distribution,
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which is given by
f = Σd,d¯Σ
−1
d¯
f¯ ,
where Σd¯ is the covariance matrix of the approximating prior distribution. Some care is
needed to construct the pseudo set d¯, because we must ensure there are enough points
to capture the features of β. This method assumes that the prior distribution over the
pseudo data set has the same properties as that over the original data set, which is a
reasonable assumption as they are both sets of Euclidean distances.
The value of the length scale parameter l can have a material impact on the results,
and it is not obvious how to assign a suitable value. We therefore place a non-informative
prior distribution on this parameter, specifically l ∼ Exp(0.01), where Exp(a) denotes
an exponential distribution with mean a−1. We assume the variance parameter α to be
known a priori, and we choose a value such that samples from the prior distribution are
over a large enough range to capture the scale of the infection rate.
3.1.2 Other Model Parameters
Recall that the infectious period distribution is assumed to be a Γ(λ, γ) distribution.
We follow Jewell et al. (2009) and assume that λ is known and place an uninformative
prior distribution on γ, specifically γ ∼ Exp(0.01).
For the infection times, we place a discrete uniform prior distribution on the label of
the initially infected farm ω. We set a time axis by assuming the first culling to be at
time zero, so that r1 = 0, and set the prior distribution on the infection time of ω by
(iω | ω) = −z, z ∼ Exp(0.01).
3.2 Markov Chain Monte Carlo Algorithm
The density of the full posterior distribution is given by
pi(β, γ, ω, iω, i, C,D | B, λ, rc, rp)
∝ exp {−Ψ}
n∏
j=1
j 6=ω
∑
k∈Yj
exp{g(dk,j)}
∏
j∈B
h(rj − ij | λ, γ)
∏
j∈C
S(rj − ij | λ, γ)
× GP(g; 0,Σ) exp{−0.01l} exp{−0.01γ} exp{0.01iω}.
The likelihood function is the same as in equation (1) and Ψ is given in equation (2)
with β replaced by the inferred value exp{g}. The term GP(g; 0,Σ) refers to the finite
dimension form of the GP, which is the probability density function of a multivariate
Gaussian distribution evaluated at g(d), with the corresponding mean vector 0 and
covariance matrix Σ. We cannot sample from the posterior distribution directly so
construct an MCMC algorithm, which is shown in Algorithm 1. There are five main
steps to the algorithm and these are described in detail below.
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Algorithm 1 Structure of the MCMC algorithm
1: Initialise the chain with values g(0), γ(0), l(0), and i(0);
Repeat the following steps:
2: Sample g using a Metropolis-Hastings step;
3: Sample l using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings step;
4: Sample γ using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings step;
5: Sample ω using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings step;
6: Sample iω using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings step;
7: Choose one of the following steps with equal probability:
• Update an infection time
• Remove an infection time for a pre-emptively culled farm
• Add an infection time for a pre-emptively culled farm
3.2.1 Updating the Infection Rate
The first step is concerned with sampling the dummy function g, which we do using an
underrelaxed proposal mechanism (Neal, 1995). This allows us to update the function
as a block while reducing computational complexity. Given the current function g, we
propose a new function g′ by
g′(d) =
√
1− δ2g(d) + δν(d), ν ∼ GP(0,Σ),
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is a tuning parameter and Σ is the covariance matrix used in the prior
distribution for β. The computational advantage of this is that the prior ratio is the
inverse of the proposal ratio so the Metropolis-Hastings acceptance probability reduces
to the likelihood ratio
pacc =
pi(i, rc,B, C,D | g′, λ, γ, ω, iω, rp)
pi(i, rc,B, C,D | g, λ, γ, ω, iω, rp) ∧ 1.
3.2.2 Updating l
To update the GP prior distribution length scale, l, we use a Gaussian random walk
Metropolis algorithm by first proposing a new length scale, l′, from N(l, σ2l ) where γ is
the current value and σ2l is a tuning parameter, and then accept l
′ with probability
pacc =
GP(g; 0,Σl′)
GP(g; 0,Σl′)
pi(l′)
pi(l)
∧ 1.
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3.2.3 Updating γ
To update γ, we also use a Gaussian random walk Metropolis algorithm by proposing
γ′ from the distribution N(γ, σ2γ) and acceping this with probability
pacc =
∏
j∈B
h(rj − ij | λ, γ′)
∏
j∈C
S(rj − ij | λ, γ′)∏
j∈B
h(rj − ij | λ, γ)
∏
j∈C
S(rj − ij | λ, γ)
pi(γ′)
pi(γ)
∧ 1.
3.2.4 Updating Infection Times
The final step in the algorithm concerns the unobserved infection times. We use a
method proposed in O’Neill and Roberts (1999) and then further developed in Jewell
et al. (2009). We choose one of three actions with equal probability: (i) propose to move
an existing infection time; (ii) propose to add a new infection time; (iii) propose to delete
a previously-added infection time.
(i) Updating an infection time of a farm in sets B or C is the simplest of the
three procedures. To do this, we randomly choose a farm j that is currently infected
and propose a new infection time by i′j = rj − tj , where tj ∼ Γ(λ, γ) and γ denotes the
current value of the parameter in the chain. We accept i′j with probability
pacc =
h(rj − ij | λ, γ)
h(rj − i′j | λ, γ)
pi(i− ij + i′j , rc | g, λ, γ, iω, rp),B, C,D)
pi(i, rc | g, λ, γ, iω, rp,B, C,D) ∧ 1,
where i− ij + i′j is the set i with ij removed and i′j included.
(ii) When adding an infection time, first define m to be the number of pre-
emptively culled farms. We suppose that at the current iteration of the algorithm, m˜
of the farms which were pre-emptively culled have had infection times added by the
algorithm; that is farms belonging in set C. We randomly choose one of the m − m˜
pre-emptively culled farms with no infection time and propose an infection time for it.
If m = m˜, we abandon this step. We generate an infection time as above and accept it
with probability
pacc =
1/(m˜+ 1)
(1/(m− m˜))h(rj − i′j | λ, γ)
pi(i + ij , r
c, C,D | g, λ, γ, iω, rp)
pi(i, rc, C,D | g, λ, γ, iω, rp) ∧ 1
=
m− m˜
(m˜+ 1)h(rj − i′j | λ, γ)
pi(i + ij , r
c, C,D | g, λ, γ, iω, rp)
pi(i, rc, C,D | g, λ, γ, iω, rp) ∧ 1.
(iii) Finally, if we choose to delete an infection time for a pre-emptively culled
farm, we randomly choose a pre-emptively culled farm j which at the current iteration
has an infection time added and we propose to remove their infection time. Should there
be no farms with an unknown infection status, which, at the current iteration of the
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algorithm, have had an infection time added, the step is abandoned. We accept this
proposal with probability
pacc =
1/(m− (m˜− 1))h(rj − ij | λ, γ)
1/m˜
pi(i− ij , rc | g, λ, γ, iω, rp,B, C,D)
pi(i, rc | g, λ, γ, iω, rp,B, C,D) ∧ 1
=
h(rj − ij | λ, γ)m˜
m− (m˜− 1)
pi(i− ij , rc,B, C,D | g, λ, γ, iω, rp)
pi(i, rc,B, C,D | g, λ, γ, iω, rp) ∧ 1.
4 Results
We now present the results of our method applied to two data sets. The first is a
simulated data set and the second is the Avian Influenza data set described in Section
1. We then use the posterior predictive distribution to analyse the impact of various
culling strategies for the Avian Influenza outbreak.
4.1 Simulation Study
We generated the position of 1,000 farms uniformly at random on a square with side
length 30km. We then simulated 250 outbreaks of Avian Influenza using the infection
rate function
β(d) = 0.6 exp{−2d}.
The infectious period distribution parameters were λ = 4 and γ = 0.8. This gives
a mean infectious period of λ/γ = 5 days, suitable for influenza-like diseases among
livestock. The simulations also included a deterministic culling strategy similar to that
in the actual outbreak, where once a farm was culled following a positive test all farms
within a 1km radius were pre-emptively culled.
We discarded simulated data sets with less than 100 infected farms, since our focus
is towards analysing sizeable outbreaks, and any nonparametric modelling approach will
struggle with a small data set. This left 175 data sets. Mimicking the data available in
the Avian Influenza outbreak, for each simulated data set we assume that in addition
to the coordinates we only observe the culling times and whether a farm has been pre-
emptively culled or not. The infectious period shape parameter is assumed to be λ = 4.
We fix the length scale parameter as l = 3 due to the computation time required to
perform inference for both the length scale and infection times for pre-emptively culled
farms for each of the simulated data sets.
We fitted the model described in Section 2 by assuming that the infection rate is
a function that depends only on the distance between farms and assigned a Gaussian
Process prior distribution as described in Section 3.1.1. Due to the number of farms, we
used the GP approximation method, constructing the pseudo set of distances by taking
256 equally-spaced points from zero to the largest distance in the data set. We employed
the MCMC algorithm described in Section 3.2 to fit the model to each of the 175 data
sets.
Figure 2 shows the median rate compared to the true rate and a 95% credible interval
constructed from all 175 posterior medians. The results demonstrate that we can infer
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the 175 posterior median values obtained in the simu-
lation study. The probability interval is from the 2.5% to 97.5% quantiles.
Parameter True Value Median 95% Prob. Int.
γ 0.8 0.787 (0.778, 0.802)
λ/γ 5 5.07 (4.99, 5.13)
i˜ 0% 1.40% (-9.18%, 23.0%)
the infection rate function well for all pairwise distances above 0.5km, but we slightly
underestimate the rate between immediate neighbours. This underestimate is caused
by there being few farms in each data set that are less than 0.5km apart. We estimate
the median infectious period to be 5.07 days, close to the true value of 5 days, and
the 95% credible interval of the 175 estimates contains the true value of 5. This slight
overestimation is likely to be caused by the combination of slight underestimation of β at
low distances, and the fact that we only considered data sets with at least 100 infections,
in which infectious periods may be slightly larger than average.
To assess the results for the infection times across all simulations, we use the relative
percentage error in the sum of the infection times for each simulated outbreak, which we
denote by i˜, defined as follows. Consider a single simulated data set. Let S denote the
sum of all infection times of farms culled either naturally or pre-emptively in the data
set. Let Sˆ denote the median estimate of S obtained from the MCMC output. Note
that Sˆ implicitly takes account of which pre-emptively culled farms are imputed to have
been infected. Then we define
i˜ =
S − Sˆ
S
× 100%.
The median relative percentage error across all data sets is 1.40%, which demonstrates
that our method for inferring infection times gives accurate results. The results for the
parameters are shown in Table 3.
4.2 Avian Influenza
We now analyse the Avian Influenza data described in Section 1. Due to the size of the
data set, we split the inference into two parts. We first inferred plausible values of the
GP prior distribution length scale parameter, l, by fitting our transmission model under
the assumptions of a constant infectious period of seven days and that pre-emptively
culled farms were not infected, as in Boender et al. (2007). We obtained a posterior
median for l of 2.75km (95% CI: (2.55, 3.01)). The reason for inferring plausible values
for l separately is that estimating l requires decomposing and inverting the covariance
matrix inside the MCMC algorithm which is highly computationally intensive and leads
to prohibitively long run times. This issue is amplified when the infection times are
unknown as well.
We repeated the inference method without assuming that the infection times or the
status of the pre-emptively culled farms are known. Based on the results of the method
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Figure 2: Top left: The results of the nonparametric method for the infection rate in
the simulated data sets. We report the median and 95% credible interval of all 175
posterior medians. Top right: The distribution of the posterior median estimates for the
mean infectious period. Bottom: The distribution of the relative error in the sum of the
infection times.
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with a fixed infectious period, we fixed α = 3 and l = 3km. We employed the GP
approximation method for this data set. As we expect the infection rate function to
vary considerably over short to medium distances, we included more such distances in
the pseudo data set. The pseudo data set was d¯ = {0, 0.5, 1, . . . , 19.5, 20, 30, . . . , 350}.
We ran the MCMC algorithm for 20,000 iterations, including a burn-in period of 500
iterations. In each iteration of the MCMC algorithm, we proposed updating, adding or
deleting 200 infection times.
The results for the infection rate are shown in Figure 3, where we see a logistic-type
function that decays to zero. From this, we estimate that the probability of a farm
infecting another farm which is more than 6km apart is negligible. From the credible
interval, we see that samples from the posterior distribution take a variety of shapes,
with functions that have a high infection rate over short distance decaying quickly, and
functions that have a lower rate over short distances taking a logistic function form.
We compare our results to those in Boender et al. (2007), particularly with a view to
comparing estimation of the infection rate function. The authors propose five models,
shown in Table 4, which we fitted to the data assuming a fixed infectious period of
seven days. Model 3 was the best of the proposed models according to the Deviance
Information Criterion (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). We refitted model 3 to the data
assuming that the infection times are unknown. The results are shown in Figure 3 and
one clear difference between the parametric and nonparametric methods is the associated
uncertainty. Although the nonparametric method allows for a greater degree of flexibility,
it also induces a greater degree of uncertainty. However, we argue that the parametric
method may underestimate the uncertainty by imposing stricter assumptions. Despite
this, both estimates are of similar shape and scale, and our results broadly agree with
existing work. We see a slight difference in the forms of the infection rate function for
distances less than 400m, which is due to there being very few farms that are less than
400m apart.
Since we assume infection times to be unknown, we infer them via our MCMC
algorithm. We estimate the mean infectious period to be 6.4 days, and Figure 4 shows
the distribution of median infectious periods by culling status. For farms that were
subject to pre-emptive culling, the median infectious period is shorter than for those
who were identified as infected. This is expected as pre-emptive culling of infected farms
introduces censoring.
We estimate the probability that each pre-emptively culled farm was actually in-
fected, as shown in Figure 4. All of the farms with non-zero probability of infection are
located in the two main infection clusters. Our results show that the transmission to
the southern cluster cannot be explained by a path of shorter distance infections that
were censored by pre-emptive culling. This is consistent with the hypothesis proposed
in Bataille et al. (2011) that this long distance transmission event of Avian Influenza
was the result of a single human-mediated transport of the virus.
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Table 4: The proposed parametric pair-wise infection rates for the Avian Influenza data
set in Boender et al. (2007).
Rate Kernel
1 β(d) = β0
2 β(d) = β0(1 + d)
−1
3 β(d) = β0(1 + d
2)−1
4 β(d) = β0(1 + d
β1)−1
5 β(d) = β0(1 + (d/β2)
β1)−1
Figure 3: The posterior mean for the nonparametric (solid) and parametric (dashed)
infection rate functions for the Avian Influenza data set. The parametric function is
kernel 3 in Table 4.
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Figure 4: Top: Posterior distribution of median infectious periods for farms with con-
firmed infections and those pre-emptivelly culled. Bottom: Estimates of probabilities
that pre-emptively culled farms were infected. Only farms which were pre-emptively
culled are plotted. Each probability is the proportion of iterations in the MCMC algo-
rithm that the pre-emptively culled farm was actually infected.
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Table 5: The culling strategy as a function of the total number of
infected farms.
Total Number of
Infected Farms (I)
Maximum Number of
Farms Culled per day
Proportion of Culling
Radius Implemented
I ≤ 33 0 0
33 ≤ I < 54 3 12
54 < I 6 1
4.3 Culling Strategies
We now investigate how to improve the disease control measures by analysing how the
culling radius affects the number of infected farms. Culling infected farms has the effect
of reducing the time a farm is infectious, and culling susceptible farms means there are
fewer farms to be infected. Although this is an effective measure for controlling the
spread of the disease, it can be expensive as farmers are compensated for lost livestock
and it can cause negative public attitudes.
To simulate the effect of culling, we sample from the posterior predictive distribution
of the infection and culling times. Given the observed culling times, and the posterior
distributions of g, γ and ω, we wish to generate new infection times i∗ for all farms, and
corresponding culling times r∗. We do this using the posterior predictive distribution,
which is given by
pi(i∗, r∗ | r) =
∫∫∫
pi(i∗, r∗ | g, γ, ω, r)pi(g, γ, ω | r)dg dγ dω.
To generate samples from this distribution we initiate the outbreak by assuming the
initially infected farm ω is the farm that was initially culled in the observed outbreak.
To consider the effectiveness of culling strategies, we assume that once an infected farm
reaches the end of its infectious period and enters the removed class all farms up to
rkm away are simultaneously culled and enter the removed class. Culling cannot start
immediately as it may take time for the authorities to be notified of the disease and
put measures into place, and whereas previous work (Backer et al., 2015) uses a fixed
delay after the first detection to initiate the culling measures, we allow for stochasticity
in the disease take-off and assume culling takes place once a certain number of farms
have been infected. As resources may not be immediately available to the authorities,
it may not be possible to cull all farms within rkm and we simulate this by fixing a
maximum number of farms that can be culled per day. We then increase this number
over the course of the outbreak as the authorities have more available resources. The
numbers are given in Table 5 and are based on the number of farms we estimate to have
been infected in the observed outbreak. Similarly, we assume the authorities will not
have sufficient resources to cull all farms within the chosen radius at the start of the
outbreak, and we model this by assuming they initially cull farms within a radius half
as large.
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Table 6: Estimates of compensation per bird paid to farmers during the Avian Influenza
outbreak from Backer et al. (2015).
Poultry Type Compensation (eper bird)
Broiler 0.98
Duck 2.09
Turkey 10.63
Layer 2.05
Table 7: Posterior predictive medians for the number of infected and culled farms and
the amount of compensation paid.
Radius (km) No. Infected Farms No. Culled Farms Compensation Paid (emillions)
0 443 (151, 644) 443 (151, 644) 24.8 (8.62, 35.9)
1 297 (110, 535) 489 (215, 709) 27.2 (12.2, 38.9)
2 283 (108, 608) 488 (217, 740) 27.5 (12.2, 41.7)
3 283 (112, 582) 517 (242, 775) 29.0 (13.2, 43.1)
4 274 (105, 564) 512 (228, 793) 28.5 (12.3, 43.9)
5 280 (109, 549) 527 (226, 797) 39.2 (12.4, 41.9)
To investigate the economic consequences of these strategies, we assume each farmer
is compensated for their culled livestock. We use additional data from the outbreak
which describes the type of poultry on each farm (broiler, duck, turkey and layer) and
the number of birds on each farm. The value of the compensation depends on the type
of bird culled, the number of birds culled, their age in weeks, and, for turkeys, their
gender. We follow Backer et al. (2015) who use the approximate rates shown in Table
6. We acknowledge this method is crude and does not take into account any of the
wider economic impacts. However, it allows us to simulate the number of farms that are
infected, the number of farms that are culled, and the compensation paid to farmers.
These three values can be used to compare the risk to public health, the impact of the
poultry industry, and the cost to the authorities.
Table 7 shows the results of the culling strategies for radii between 0km and 5km. A
culling radius of 0km denotes the authorities taking no action. It is clear that taking any
course of action is better than taking none, but we also see that more ambitious strategies
show little gain in reducing the median number of farms infected in an outbreak. The
effect of culling at larger radii results in a larger number of culled farms and a higher
amount of compensation, but does not result in a considerable reduction in the number
of infected farms. This is because the maximum number of farms culled per day is
quickly reached, even for small culling radii. In the data set, the average density of
farms was approximately 2 per km2, whereas a culling radius of 2km covers over 12km2.
These results are broadly in line with those in Backer et al. (2015), which also suggest
that larger culling radii do not result in a considerable reduction in the number of infected
farms. However, as we use a much smaller estimate for the maximum number of farms
culled per day, we do not observe a large difference between culling radii of 1km and
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2km.
5 Conclusions
We have presented an analysis of an outbreak of Avian Influenza in poultry farms in
the Netherlands using a Bayesian nonparametric approach. Our approach demonstrates
that it is possible to model the spatially heterogeneous infection rate for infectious dis-
eases nonparametrically, and that GPs provide a flexible framework for doing so. This
nonparametric methodology allows us to reduce the need for strict parametric assump-
tions, which are often made for mathematical or practical convenience and may have
little scientific basis. Our methods also allow us to account for missing data, specifically
the unobserved process of infection, without making unrealistic simplifying assumptions.
The methods we have described require more time and computational power than the
standard parametric methods, especially when employed in conjunction with an MCMC
approach to sample from the desired posterior distribution. We have however somewhat
alleviated these issues by using a GP approximation method which appears to work well
in our applications.
With regards to the Avian Influenza data set, our methodology has allowed us to
approach the infection process in a more flexible way than previous methods. Our
estimates are in line with previous work, and combining this method with previously
developed MCMC techniques and data augmentation allows us to analyse this data set
in more detail than has previously been possible, including determining whether pre-
emptively culled farms had been infected. The uncertainty around our estimates is
larger than that of previous parametric methods, but since we do not assume specific
parametric models then our methods are, in some sense, giving a fairer quantification
of uncertainty. We are able to use the posterior predictive distribution to analyse the
effect of different control strategies which can be used to inform policy in this area.
In this paper, we have focussed on spatial heterogeneity as the key determinant of
the infection rate. In reality, it is possible that the number and type of animals on
the farms was also important. Given appropriate data, it is natural to build a model
which contains such data as covariates. One way of doing this would be to consider each
covariate as a separate dimension of the GP. Another possible extension is to consider
different covariance functions beyond the squared exponential function, which could be
appropriate in some applications.
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